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I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing, forty-one states have statutes or constitutional provisions that prevent same-sex couples from marrying under state law by defining marriage as between one man and one
1
The statutes and constitutional provisions were mostly
woman.

1
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States with constitutional provisions defining marriage as between one man and one
woman include: Alabama (2006), Alaska (1998), Arizona (2008), Arkansas (2004), California (2008), Colorado (2008), Florida (2008), Georgia (2004), Idaho (2006), Kansas
(2005), Kentucky (2004), Louisiana (2004), Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Missouri (2004), Montana (2004), Nebraska (2000), Nevada (2002), North Dakota (2004),
Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (2004), Oregon (2004), South Carolina (2006), South Dakota
(2006), Tennessee (2006), Texas (2005), Utah (2004), Virginia (2006), and Wisconsin
(2006). See ALA. CONST. amend. 774; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX,
§ 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § IV; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art.
XV, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233A; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS.
CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art.
XV, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15;
S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art I, § 32; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13; see also HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), available at
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (providing a visual reference for states
and their current legislative statutes regarding same-sex marriage as well as the enactment
dates of state constitutional provisions). Several of these states ban all forms of same-sex
unions, not only same-sex marriages. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art I, § 32 (“Marriage in this
state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. This state or a political
subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to
marriage.”). In addition to those states listed above, states with a statute restricting marriage to one man and one woman include: Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), available at http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide
Marriage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). Note that the legislatures of
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passed subsequent to the federal Defense of Marriage Act
2
(“DOMA”), in which Congress barred federal recognition of samesex marriage and allowed the states to do so as well, by permitting
states not to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other
3
states. DOMA was passed partly in response to attempts at legalizing
4
same-sex marriage. Its proponents expressed concern over the potential extension of state and federal marriage-related benefits to
5
same-sex couples. These benefits run the gamut, but often include
employment benefits, such as bereavement leave and sick leave, unemployment compensation, and healthcare insurance for public sec6
tor employees, their partners, and dependents.

2

3

4

5

6

  

Washington and Maryland have since passed laws allowing same-sex marriage, but the
laws have not yet taken effect. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DEFINING
MARRIAGE: DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACTS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/Issues-Research/Human-Services/Same-Sex-Marriage-overview.aspx
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012). California’s gay marriage ban has been found invalid by a federal court of appeals, but the court’s enforcement is pending further appeals. Id. See also
Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *11 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012)
(holding that “Proposition 8 serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen
the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify
their relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples”). The information in this footnote is verified as of April 18, 2012.
See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No
State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding
of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising
from such relationship.”). Three states—Wyoming (1957), Maryland (1973), and New
Hampshire (1987)—have statutes defining marriage that pre-dated DOMA, although the
Maryland legislature has recently passed a same-sex marriage law; see NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS,
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices
/SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). See also Andrew
Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 265–66 (2007)
(referring to most state statutes banning same-sex marriage as “mini-DOMAs” because
they mimic the effects of the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996).
See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); Mark Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 399, 402, 412 (2010) (discussing the two provisions of
DOMA).
See Strasser, supra note 3, at 401 n.9 (quoting In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 132 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. Aug. 17, 2004) (“Congress recognized that the Hawaii Supreme Court appeared to
be on the verge of requiring the State of Hawaii to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples.”)).
See 142 CONG. REC. 22448 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“On a more pragmatic level
although no less important, this bill also addresses concerns with respect to the matter of
Federal benefits.”).
See, e.g., Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits: Redefining Family in the Work
Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 49, 50 (1994) (“Benefits employers confer upon domestic
partners include various combinations of bereavement leave, family sick leave, health in-
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In states that contain statutory and constitutional restrictions on
7
same-sex marriage, public-sector employees in same-sex relationships
are usually ineligible for the employment benefits that are traditionally bestowed upon their married, heterosexual counterparts. Nevertheless, several states, cities, and local municipalities have successfully
8
extended public employment benefits to same-sex couples, despite
9
continued political resistance. These benefits are typically granted
to same-sex and opposite-sex couples who register their domestic
partnership with the state, city, or local government, according to
10
some established criteria. Yet legislative acts, public referenda, and
judicial decisions in several communities have recently resulted in
11
In these
same-sex public employment benefits being withdrawn.

7

8

9

10
11

  

surance coverage, subsidized travel and relocation expenses, and employee discounts.”);
Sue Nussbaum Averill, Comment, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex Couples Battle For Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253, 253 n.5 (1993) (“These benefits include
but may not be limited to health and dental insurance, life insurance, various types of
leave, Social Security, workers’ compensation, unemployment compensation, and
pension or retirement plans.”).
Generally, the terms “same-sex relationship(s)” or “same-sex couple(s)” and “domestic
partner(s)” or “domestic partnership(s)” are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment, and unless domestic partner(s) or partnership(s) are qualified by “oppositesex,” they will refer to same-sex domestic partner(s) or partnership(s).
This Comment uses “public employee benefit(s)” or “public employment benefit(s)” and
“state employee benefit(s)” or “state employment benefit(s)” interchangeably, but state
employee or employment benefits also refer to benefits provided by local governments
and municipalities within each state unless noted otherwise.
States with domestic partnership laws that incorporate same-sex couples include: California, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin,
and the District of Columbia;. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-22-101 (LexisNexis 2010); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. 17.04.13.01 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A1, 26:8A-4 (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.010, 122A.100 (Lexis-Nexis 2009);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.300 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010,
26.60.030 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. §§ 770.001, 770.05 (2011). For an example of a domestic partnership at the county level, see Domestic Partner Registry,
WESTCHESTERGOV.COM, http://lgbt.westchestergov.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=2561&Itemid=4427 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). For examples of domestic partnership laws in cities, see New York City, N.Y., CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE § 3-240
(West 2010), and S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 62.1, 62.3 (2006).
See supra note 9. (providing several state and municipal statutes as evidence of criteria for
and registration of domestic partnerships).
See, e.g., Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800–01 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d sub
nom. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011) (evaluating House Bill 2013,
passed by the Arizona legislature, and signed into law by Governor Janet Brewer). Although the district court case title for the order granting a preliminary injunction was Collins, et al. v. Brewer, et al., on June 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiff-appellee’s
unopposed motion to dismiss Tracy Collins. The Ninth Circuit’s decision is therefore
titled Diaz, et al. v. Brewer, et al.. For clarity, this Comment will refer to the entire case as
Diaz v. Brewer, the district court proceedings as Diaz I, and the appeals court proceedings
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communities, same-sex couples may no longer be eligible to register
12
for public benefits, or same-sex couples who were previously regis13
tered may even have their public benefits discontinued.
By drawing on the parallel analytical frameworks that exist within
state and federal equal protection jurisprudence, this Comment proposes that arguments premised on state equal protection clauses,
which have already found limited success in the expansion of samesex public employee benefits, should serve as guidance for litigants
and courts coping with federal Equal Protection Clause claims that
seek to prevent the rescission of such benefits. It is important to note
that the act of rescission itself does not directly affect a court’s equal
14
However, the withdrawal of public benefits
protection analysis.
from employees in same-sex relationships, coupled with state statutes
or constitutional provisions banning same-sex marriage, helps to resolve one of the traditional dilemmas faced by courts. Such a selective withdrawal helps to clarify the distinction as one between samesex and opposite-sex couples, as opposed to one between married
and unmarried ones—thereby enabling courts to find that the classification was made on the basis of sexual orientation.
Prior legal actions brought by same-sex couples to secure state
employment benefits have already demonstrated that arguments
premised on state equal protection clauses can be successful in fighting to extend the benefits to same-sex couples. In Tanner v. Oregon
Health Sciences University, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the
university’s denial of health insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of its gay and lesbian employees was a violation of

12
13
14

as Diaz II. See also Ana Campoy, Same-Sex Benefits Ban Roils El Paso, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
2010, at A4 (reporting that the El Paso public referendum stripped employee benefits
from everyone other than the employee, his or her legal spouse, and dependent children); Barry Noreen, She Risks Her Life for Us, but We Deny Care for Her Partner, COLO.
SPRINGS GAZETTE, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.gazette.com/articles/draper26785-benefits-city.html (reporting on the Colorado Springs City Council’s rescission of
healthcare benefits for same-sex partners of city employees); Jennifer Medina, A Town in
Westchester Ends Health Benefits for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at B1 (reporting that the Eastchester Town Board agreed to no longer offer domestic partner benefits
for its employees).
See Medina, supra note 11 (“[T]he Town Board voted . . . to end a town policy of providing coverage for domestic partners.”).
See Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (“[The legislative act] eliminates family coverage for non-spouse domestic partners, whether they are of the same or different sex.”).
See Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *38 (9th Cir. Feb. 7,
2012) (finding that Proposition 8’s withdrawal from same-sex couples of the existing designation of marriage was not significant in the court’s constitutional analysis).
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Oregon’s equal privileges and immunities clause. Even though the
court did not find that the state’s anti-discrimination policy was violated, it nevertheless viewed the benefits policy as facially discriminatory since the benefits were “made available on terms that, for gay
16
and lesbian couples, are a legal impossibility.”
As seen in Tanner, the extension of same-sex state employee benefits occurs even in states with explicit prohibitions on same-sex mar17
riage. The case of Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska
held that the limitation of state employee benefits solely to opposite18
sex spouses violated Alaska’s equal protection clause. The plaintiffs
in Carter were same-sex couples challenging the benefits programs,
not Alaska’s marriage amendment, as discriminatory by denying them
benefits that the state affords to similarly situated heterosexual
19
Carter rejected the reasoning advanced in several other
couples.
states that compared lesbians and gay men to unmarried heterosex15

16
17

18

19

Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that
“OHSU’s denial of insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of its homosexual employees violated Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution”). Oregon’s
equal privileges and immunities clause is generally considered to have the same scope as
the federal Equal Protection Clause. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed
granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”); Cooper v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 629
P.2d 386, 391 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing how the scope of Article I, section 20 and
that of the federal Equal Protection Clause are generally the same, although Article I, section 20 can be interpreted more broadly if there is a legal basis for doing so).
Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448.
See Eric J. Lobsinger, Comment, A National Model for Reconciling Equal Protection For SameSex Couples With State Marriage Amendments: Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v.
Alaska, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2006) (discussing the Alaska Supreme Court decision in Carter and suggesting that it provides a work-around for states with marriage
amendments to retain their amendments while simultaneously securing important rights
for same-sex couples). Note that Oregon’s constitutional amendment defining marriage
between one man and one woman was passed in 2004, subsequent to the decision in
Tanner, but at the time of Tanner there were Oregon statutes that defined marriage as between one man and one woman. Compare HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE
MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (2010), available at http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/mapsof-state-laws-policies (follow “Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws”) (last visited Dec. 4,
2011), with Tanner, 971 P.2d at 448 (concluding that “OHSU’s denial of insurance benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of its homosexual employees violated Article I,
section 20, of the Oregon Constitution”), and OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.010, 106.041 (2007)
(defining marriage as between a man and woman and providing for marriage license application procedures).
See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2005)
(holding that programs offering valuable benefits to state employees’ spouses that are not
offered to unmarried state employees’ domestic partners violate equal protection under
the Alaska Constitution).
Id. at 787 (“They argue not that they have a right to marry each other, but that the benefits programs discriminate against them by denying them benefits that the programs provide to others who, plaintiffs claim, are similarly situated.”).
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20

ual couples, where courts found that the benefits plans were not
21
Even
discriminatory since they applied equally to both groups.
though Tanner, Carter, and other early cases dealt with attempts to extend employment benefits to same-sex couples, similar arguments
have been and should be made for the retention of benefits previously granted by state or local governments.
Moreover, the same arguments are now being brought into federal court, under the federal Equal Protection Clause. A case recently
22
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, Diaz v. Brewer, was filed by Lambda
Legal on behalf of several same-sex couples who would potentially be
deprived of Arizona state employee domestic partner benefits following the signing of Arizona House Bill 2013 into law by Governor Ja23
nice K. Brewer on September 4, 2009. The bill, which contained an
amendment entitled “Section O,” would eliminate insurance coverage for state employees’ domestic partners and/or their children, regardless of whether the domestic partnership is same-sex or opposite24
sex. This case appears to present an issue of first impression in federal court, by challenging a state’s rescission of same-sex employee
benefits on the grounds that it violates the federal Equal Protection
25
Clause.
In an important step, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a prelim26
inary injunction to protect the benefits of the same-sex couples.
The appeals court agreed with the district court and found that Section O “distinguish[es] between homosexual and heterosexual employees, similarly situated,” thus denying homosexual employees the

20

21
22
23

24
25
26

See Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL 1217283, at
*5 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (citing Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689
A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883
P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1994); Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Ct. App.
1992); Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); Hinman v.
Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)) (reviewing cases in which
“courts held that lesbians and gay men in committed relationships were similarly situated
to unmarried heterosexuals”).
See Bedford, 2006 WL 1217283, at *6 (noting that Carter rejected the reasoning that homosexual couples were similarly situated to unmarried heterosexual couples).
656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011).
See Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799–801 (D. Ariz. 2010) (explaining
the posture of the complaint filed and the implications of House Bill 2013). The statute
challenged has been codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-651 (1971).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
Id.; Complaint at 34, Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. 2:09-cv02402-JWS).
Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d at 1010.
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same benefits for doing equivalent work as heterosexual employees.
Similar legal issues have subsequently been raised in Martin v. El Paso,
a case filed in response to a voter referendum passed in El Paso, Texas that stripped domestic partner benefits from the city’s public em28
ployees. As the arc of history bends towards greater equality for gay
and lesbian individuals, Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso illustrate
the continued importance of the federal Equal Protection Clause as
same-sex couples fight to retain equal employment benefits in the
public sector.
In Part II, this Comment seeks to understand why litigants have
chosen to file early cases over same-sex state employee benefits in
29
state courts asserting (for the most part) state equal protectionbased claims, as opposed to federal Equal Protection Clause claims in
federal court. This section also explores federal equal protection
analysis and argues that litigants in federal courts can learn from the
experiences of litigants in state courts. In Part III, this Comment
briefly discusses the complications that accompany claims based on
state anti-discrimination statutes, and suggests that an emphasis on
state and federal equal protection claims would be more beneficial to
litigants. In Part IV, this Comment reviews the three primary interpretative difficulties that state courts have faced when resolving legal
arguments that seek to extend state employment benefits to same-sex
couples based upon state equal protection clauses. In Part V, this
Comment looks at how these difficulties of judicial interpretation
have affected current controversies over the repeal of these benefits
in federal court. Finally, Part VI suggests that future cases on this
subject will allow for more expansive federal equal protection interpretation, in the same vein as recent state equal protection jurisprudence.

27
28

29

Id. at 1014.
See Complaint at 4, Martin v. El Paso, No. 2010-4936 (El Paso Cnty. Ct., 34th Jud. Dist.
Dec. 15, 2010) (explaining how the ordinance removed health benefits from same-sex
partners). The case has since been transferred to federal court. See infra note 204. Even
more recently, the issues have emerged in Bassett v. Synder, a case filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union in Michigan asking the court to strike down a state law barring public employers from providing domestic partner benefits to their employees. See Complaint at 2 & 30, Bassett v. Synder, No. 2:12-cv-10038 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012), available
at http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/bassett-et-al-v-snyder-complaint (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
Prior to Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso, Ross appears to be the exception, where the
plaintiff filed claims in state court under both state and federal equal protection and due
process clauses. Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 521 (Colo.
App. 1994).
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II. THE CHOICE: STATE OR FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS (OR
BOTH)?
Although many states, cities, and local governments have adopted
domestic partnerships laws and have expanded state employee bene30
fits to cover same-sex couples and their dependents, the majority of
jurisdictions across the country fail to provide these benefits. As a result, one available recourse for same-sex couples who seek benefits in
these jurisdictions is through judicial action. Claims to extend or
prevent the rescission of same-sex public employee benefits can be
brought under a state’s equal protection clause or under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Consti31
tution (or both).
Almost all of the earlier state cases seeking to extend public employee benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of the employees
on the basis of equal protection relied upon state equal protection
32
clauses, as opposed to the federal Equal Protection Clause. Part of
the explanation behind litigants’ decision to proceed with claims
based on state equal protection clauses may be that forty-five of the
fifty U.S. states have given their own equal protection clauses “more
expansive interpretations than that accorded to [the Equal Protec33
tion Clause of] the United States Constitution.” This is a result of
30
31
32

33

  

See supra note 9 (providing numerous examples of states that have passed statutes expanding benefits to same-sex couples).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784 (Alaska 2005)
(alleging violations under the Alaska Constitution); Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213
Cal. Rptr. 410, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (considering violations under the California Constitution); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 447 (Mont. 2004) (considering violations under the Montana Constitution); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435,
437 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (alleging violations under the Oregon Constitution). In addition, several cases raised claims to extend same-sex public employee benefits on the basis
of other grounds, which are mostly outside the limited scope of this Comment. See, e.g.,
Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411 (making a claim based on state executive order and state
equal protection clause claim); Ross, 883 P.2d at 521 (making a claim from state agency’s
anti-discrimination rule, but coupled with state and federal equal protection and due
process constitutional claims); Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 62
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (addressing a statutory claim without constitutional claims); Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 448 (making other state constitutional claims in addition to equal protection); Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL
1217283, at *4 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (making a statutory claim without constitutional claims). But see a brief discussion of statutory claims based upon anti-discrimination
statutes infra Part III.
See 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 1.7 (2011) (including the states of: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
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the states’ ability “[to] define their internal law more expansively
34
than the federal Constitution is construed.” Therefore, state court
judges have been willing to interpret state constitutional guarantees
of equal protection more broadly than the federal Equal Protection
35
Clause to include the rights of same-sex public employees. This is
the case even when the language of the state equal protection guar36
antee is similar or identical to the federal Equal Protection Clause.
This also suggests that the litigants may choose to proceed in state
court because they are forum shopping. One commentator has
noted that “the make-up of the bench is the most important factor
when the legitimacy of domestic partner benefits is raised,” given the
similarity of the analysis that state courts engage in under their re37
spective state equal protection clauses.
Despite the decision of litigants to proceed in state court and adjudicate claims brought under state equal protection clauses, this
Comment argues that these cases hold significant relevance for litigants in federal court who raise similar claims under the federal
Equal Protection Clause. The relevance is grounded in the parallel
legal analyses that courts often employ under both state and federal
equal protection clauses. While it would be too difficult for this
Comment to undertake a comprehensive review of state equal protection jurisprudence, the examples of state equal protection jurisprudence discussed in Part III below largely employ concepts of federal
equal protection jurisprudence.
When Congress or a state legislature enacts a statute, the statute
usually contains a classification that categorizes people into groups
38
on the basis of some characteristic. Federal equal protection guar-

34
35
36

37
38

  

Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).
Id.
Id.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977) (“Other examples abound where state courts have independently considered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state
and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased.”).
Heidi Eischen, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits
Legislation, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 546 (2000).
See Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 34 (2010) (“All laws must
classify and thereby create classes of people who are treated differently.”); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 345
(1949) (“To define a class is simply to designate a quality or characteristic or trait or rela-
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antees “that those classifications will not be based upon impermissible
39
criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals.” Therefore, “[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all persons
40
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.”
Some laws will contain a classification that requires the court to
determine whether, under the principles of federal equal protection,
41
the law is facially valid. Thus, challenges to laws with facial classifications have two steps: (1) the plaintiffs must show that the law results
in members of one group being treated differently from others on
42
the basis of their membership; and (2) if differential treatment of
an identifiable group is shown, then the court must determine
whether the treatment is justified under the appropriate level of scru43
tiny. Other statutes do not classify on their face, but instead may be
44
applied in a way that creates a classification. In such cases, plaintiffs
must allege and prove “an unlawful intent to discriminate against the
45
plaintiff for an invalid reason.” This may require the court to engage in further judicial inquiry into the nature of the classification, its
46
purpose, and its effect.
After identifying the classification, courts then look at the end or
purpose of the statute and determine whether the classification is sufficiently related to that end and meets the equal protection guaran47
tee. The ultimate conclusion of whether the classification satisfies
federal equal protection usually hinges upon the degree of judicial
scrutiny that the court chooses to exercise over the legislature’s sta48
tute. At least three levels of judicial scrutiny are applied by courts in

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

46
47
48

tion, or any combination of these, the possession of which, by an individual, determines
his membership in or inclusion within the class.”).
3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.2(a)
(4th ed. 2008).
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 38, at 346.
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39 at § 18.3(a)(i).
Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (C.D. Ill.
1997) (citing Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423–24 (1981)).
Hamyln, 986 F. Supp. at 1134 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217–18 (1982)).
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(i).
See Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). The
Hamlyn court noted that “[t]he goal of requiring intent is to protect the government
from liability for mere negligence in the application of otherwise valid laws. Thus, in order to give rise to a constitutional grievance, a departure from the norm must be rooted
in design and not derive merely from error or fallible judgment.” Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at
1133 (citing Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 180 (7th Cir. 1995)).
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(v).
Id. at § 18.3(a)(i).
Id.
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equal protection cases, which in turn relate to the type of classification that the legislature employs in its statute.
Classifications in equal protection cases are usually categorized into three groups: (1) race, ethnicity, and alienage; (2) gender and il49
legitimacy; and (3) all other classifications. Laws that classify on the
50
basis of race, ethnicity, or alienage are subject to the court’s most
stringent equal protection test—known as “strict scrutiny”—whereby
the classification must be narrowly tailored to only “compelling” gov51
ernment interests. The application of this test likely means that the
52
law will be overturned. Laws with gender classifications must further an “important” government interest, and the classification must
53
be “substantially related” to achieving the law’s end. Lastly, for laws
that contain all other classifications, the court applies “rational basis
review,” which requires a finding that a classification is “rationally re54
lated” to achieving a “legitimate” purpose.
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, some states have interpreted
their own constitutions by extending equal protection to cover
55
groups based on other characteristics. It is important to note that
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation receive strict scrutiny
56
57
in California and quasi-suspect scrutiny in Connecticut. But this
Comment looks at several examples of state equal protection jurisprudence where sexual orientation is apparently being treated under rational basis review—even though, in reality, the review is more
58
searching. Finally, after identifying the classification, the law’s purpose, and after determining which level of scrutiny will apply, the
court is usually able to evaluate the law and determine whether it
upholds the guarantee of equal protection.
49

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011); Paul E.
McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV.
209, 221 (1998).
The use of these traits in legislative classifications has been referred to as “suspect” by the
courts. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(iii).
McGreal, supra note 49, at 221.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 232. The Supreme Court has also held that intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on illegitimacy. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.3(a)(iv).
McGreal, supra note 49, at 238.
See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 757 n.73.
Id. (citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441–43, 452 (Cal. 2008)).
Yoshino, supra note 49, at 757 n.73 (citing Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 412 (Conn. 2008)).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When
a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal
Protection Clause.”).
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After a brief discussion of state statutory claims in Part III, this
Comment will look to state equal protection clause jurisprudence in
Alaska, California, Oregon, Montana, and New Hampshire, relating
59
to the expansion of same-sex public employee benefits in Part IV.
Part V below will look at Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso to see
how federal courts are dealing with similar doctrinal challenges, and
in Part VI, this Comment addresses the future of federal equal protection jurisprudence. As will be demonstrated below, state and federal courts engage in parallel equal protection analyses, such that
prior decisions on state equal protection grounds provide strong
guidance for litigants in federal court who seek to prevent the repeal
of same-sex public employee benefits under the federal Equal Protection Clause.
III. THE PRESENCE OF STATUTORY CLAIMS BASED ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
One significant difference between the state cases discussed below
that has led to varied legal analysis and court outcomes is the presence of anti-discrimination statutes and their respective claims
brought by litigants. State anti-discrimination statutes currently pro60
tect gays and lesbians in several contexts, including the workplace.
Aside from providing causes of action outside the scope of equal protection, state and federal anti-discrimination statutes usually require
parties and the court to apply either a disparate treatment or disparate impact framework to its analysis, and to identify the classification

59

60

See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005); Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Tanner v. Or.
Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104
P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004); Bedford v. N.H. Comm. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230,
2006 WL 1217283, at *1 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006). See also McGreal, supra note 49.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West 2011) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in public and private employment,
housing, and public accommodations); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-101 (West 2010)
(prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in public and private employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 2002) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in public and private employment). Although federal antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII have not been interpreted to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, some of these claims nevertheless fall under
Title VII jurisprudence in the form of “sex-stereotyping” or discrimination on the basis of
sex. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that “sex
discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII”).

Apr. 2012]

SAME-SEX EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

1363

61

at issue. Claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment exist
where an employer “treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or [other protected characte62
ristic].” On the other hand, disparate impact claims involve a facially neutral employment practice that burdens one group more than
another, without the requirement of an employer’s subjective, dis63
criminatory intent that is required for disparate treatment claims.
State statutory claims have not had much success in the expansion of
same-sex employee benefits. This is in part because they involve
64
complex interactions between the two analytical frameworks, and
61

62

63
64

  

Due to the classification requirement and some state courts’ (like Alaska and Oregon)
usage of disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks in equal protection jurisprudence, there can be significant overlap of the legal analysis of equal protection and
anti-discrimination claims. See infra Part IV.
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (citing Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (describing that proof of discriminatory motive is critical)).
Even though proof of intentional discrimination is a required element for disparate
treatment analysis under federal anti-discrimination laws like Title VII, not all states require discriminatory intent for disparate treatment analysis of state constitutional violations, nor do federal courts for federal constitutional violations. See Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (“[I]ntent
does not need to be alleged or proved in a case where a government program, policy or
statute is challenged on its face.”); Tanner, 971 P.2d at 447 (“As in Zockert, OHSU’s intentions in this case are not relevant. What is relevant is the extent to which privileges or
immunities are not made available to all citizens on equal terms.”).
Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 52–53.
Even in the state cases this Comment studies, there is confusion amongst courts and
commentators over whether the decisions view the classification at issue as facial or neutral, and thus whether they apply a disparate impact or a disparate treatment framework
to the state equal protection clause claims. When discussing the constitutional claim, the
Tanner court states that “Article I, section 20, does protect against disparate treatment of
true classes, those that have identity apart from the challenged law itself.” Tanner, 971
P.2d at 445. The court goes on to find that the class, same-sex couples, “clearly is defined
in terms of ad hominem, personal and social characteristics . . . [and these individuals] are
members of a suspect class.” Id. at 447. As such, the unintended effect of their action was
“to treat a true class of citizens disparately in violation of Article I, section 20.” Id. These
statements strongly suggest that the court was applying a disparate treatment analysis, as
opposed to the disparate impact analysis suggested by some commentators. See, e.g., Eischen, supra note 37, at 535–36 (suggesting that the court viewed the policy as facially neutral under statutory and constitutional claims, which would entail disparate impact analysis); Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment Cases in the United
States and the European Union, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 115, 155 (2010) (stating that the “Tanner
court clarified that it was using a disparate impact rather than a disparate treatment
framework,” but citing to the court’s disposition of the statutory claim as opposed to Oregon’s constitutional provision). Interestingly, the Carter decision cites to Tanner for its
finding that the “denial of employment benefits to unmarried domestic partners of employees had ‘disparate impact’ on homosexuals,” Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 n.31, but the
court’s ultimate approach seems to reflect the ambiguity inherent in Tanner. It appears
that the Carter court read the Tanner decision as having a disparate impact analysis, yet
the Carter court went on to find that the programs facially discriminate against homosex-
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claims of disparate impact, in particular, are very difficult to prove.
Additionally, they may also require a finding that gays and lesbians
66
are a protected or suspect class.
An example of a case based upon a state anti-discrimination statute illustrates the difficulties associated with such claims. In Monson
v. Rochester Athletic Club, a case involving Minnesota’s public accommodations anti-discrimination statute, the court found that the
health club’s policy of allowing only married couples to participate in
a family-membership rate was not facially discriminatory with respect
67
to same-sex couples. The court held that it was facially neutral, such
that “it denies family memberships to unmarried heterosexual
68
couples and unmarried homosexual couples alike.” Since a disparate impact theory was unavailable to the plaintiffs under the public
69
accommodations statute, their claim was ultimately unsuccessful.
How the court defines the classification and the eventual outcome of
cases with anti-discrimination claims will vary according to statutory
70
language, judicial precedent, the make-up of the bench, as well as
the analytical framework applied by the court. Due to the challenges
that accompany these claims, this Comment emphasizes the importance of state and federal equal protection claims as a means for the
retention of same-sex public employee benefits.

65

66

67

68
69

70

uals under a disparate treatment analysis in a manner similar to Tanner. Compare id. at
788 (concluding that the programs are facially discriminatory), with Tanner, 971 P.2d at
447 (holding that even though the defendant had no intention to treat the plaintiffs disparately, it did just that).
See Linos, supra note 64, at 132 (“Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases fare worse
than plaintiffs generally, and plaintiffs making disparate impact claims are particularly
likely to lose.” (internal citations omitted)).
See Tanner, 971 P.2d at 444 (finding that the plaintiffs are members of a protected class
but nevertheless holding that the state did not engage in an unlawful employment practice).
See Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]t is
only when the policy combines with the marriage statute that a disparate impact occurs.”).
Id. (identifying the classification as between married and unmarried couples).
Id. at 67 (finding a disparate impact framework unavailable due to the statutory language
which “focuses solely on the public-accommodation provider’s conduct in denying the
full and fair enjoyment of the accommodation and does not address the effects of the
provider’s conduct caused by other factors”).
See Linos, supra note 64, at 152–55 (arguing that U.S. courts are unlikely to read antidiscrimination statutes broadly in the context of same-sex employee benefit claims due to
existing precedent).
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IV. THE THREE INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES OF STATE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAIMS IN THE EXPANSION OF SAME-SEX PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
While several cases challenging the denial of same-sex public em71
ployee benefits were ultimately unsuccessful, other cases have been
successful based upon their ability to navigate the three main inter72
pretative difficulties of state equal protection clause claims: (1) the
court’s identification of a statute’s classification; (2) the level of scrutiny that the court applies; and, at least in certain claims, (3) whether
a discriminatory intent is present.
A. The Classification Dilemma
Beginning in 1985, gay and lesbian litigants confronted state
courts with claims that sought to establish their right to employee
benefits for their same-sex spouse or dependents. In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration, the Court of Appeals for the Third
District of California held that the denial of the dental care benefits
to the partners of state employees did not violate the equal protec73
tion clause of the California Constitution. The dental care plans in
question allowed employees to enroll their spouse or unmarried

71

72

73

See, e.g., Monson, 759 N.W.2d at 67 (affirming a judgment that a Minnesota health club’s
policy of allowing only married couples to participate in a family membership rate was facially neutral with respect to same-sex couples and did not violate the state’s public accommodations anti-discrimination statute); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps.,
883 P.2d 516, 520 (Colo. App. 1994) (holding that the denial of family sick leave benefits
for the plaintiff to care for her same-sex partner “treat homosexual employees and similarly situated heterosexual employees differently”).
Although this section focuses on the state equal protection claims brought in cases to expand same-sex public employee benefits, similar interpretive challenges apply to federal
Equal Protection Clause claims and will be discussed in Part V in the context of Diaz v.
Brewer and Martin v. El Paso.
Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). Note that
Hinman has since been superseded by statute and has been called into doubt by In re Marriage Cases, among others. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (determining that the Court of Appeals in California erred in refusing to apply strict scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation); Knight v. Schwarzenegger, 2004 WL 2011407
(Cal. Super. Sep. 8, 2004) (acknowledging that the validity of Hinman had been called into question by subsequent statutes and judicial decisions). However, the discussion of
Hinman in this Comment, like other early cases, is due to its historical importance as an
example of early judicial thought with regard to equal protection analysis.
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74

child, but at that time California’s Civil Code statutorily defined a
75
marriage as between one man and one woman.
The court’s equal protection clause analysis began by determining
what classification was made by the dental care plans, because “persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of a law
76
deserve like treatment.” The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that homosexual state employees with same-sex partners are
similarly situated to heterosexual state employees married to their
opposite-sex spouses, instead finding that the dental plans made “a
distinction solely on the basis of married and unmarried employees
77
or annuitants, not between heterosexual or homosexual ones.”
Subsequent early cases followed a similar analysis to Hinman, based
primarily on the notion that employee benefit plans limiting employees’ beneficiaries to married spouses created a distinction between married and unmarried couples, as opposed to one between
78
heterosexual and homosexual couples.
In Tanner, the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether the
state’s failure to provide employment benefits to same-sex couples violated Oregon’s equal privileges and immunities clause or its em79
ployment anti-discrimination statute for lesbian and gay employees.
After finding that the statute had not been violated, the Tanner court
went on to find that the benefits created a classification between heterosexual and homosexual couples, since the latter were unable to
marry, and held that the benefits policy violated Oregon’s equal privi-

74
75

76

77

78

79

Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1985) (“Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a
civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of
making that contract is necessary.”).
Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 415. See also Purdy v. California, 456 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1969)
(“The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition
that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive
like treatment.”).
Hinman, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416. See also Hargrove, supra note 6, at 51 (noting that the
Hinman court “declined to acknowledge that lesbian and gay couples can have relationships similar to those of married couples”).
See, e.g., Phillips v. Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the benefits policy applies equally to heterosexual and homosexual employees, thus
finding that it does not discriminate against the plaintiffs on the basis of sexual orientation); Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hosps., 883 P.2d 516, 520 (Colo. App. 1994)
(finding that since “[a]n unmarried heterosexual employee also would not be permitted
to take family sick leave benefits to care for his or her unmarried opposite-sex partner . . . the rule does not treat homosexual employees and similarly situated heterosexual
employees differently”).
See supra text accompanying note 15.
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80

leges and immunities clause. Tanner was the first major case to recognize that benefits provided to spouses of married state employees
actually treat homosexual employees differently from heterosexual
employees, and to hold the policy unconstitutional.
81
Decided in the aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, the Montana Supreme Court in Snetsinger v. Montana University Systems found that the
state university system was violating the equal protection rights of its
82
same-sex employees by denying benefits to their partners. Unlike
the policy at issue in Tanner, the benefits policy in Snetsinger provided
83
the benefits to unmarried opposite-sex couples, as well. As a result,
the true classification made by the program was one between unmarried opposite-sex couples and unmarried same-sex couples, which allowed the court to avoid determining whether the policy violated
84
equal protection by classifying the couples based on sex. Nevertheless, classifications between unmarried opposite-sex couples and unmarried same-sex couples should be viewed as having the same effect
as classifications between opposite-sex and same-sex couples more
broadly, because they both draw irrational distinctions on the basis of
85
sexual orientation. As a result of these distinctions, courts, including the court in Snetsinger, find that there is no legitimate reason for
86
the government to treat the two groups differently.
Carter was a case that addressed the constitutionality of the denial
of benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and lesbian state em80

81

82

83

84

85
86

See Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
since homosexuals are not able to marry, the benefit program discriminates on the basis
of sexual orientation and violates Oregon’s constitution). See also supra text accompanying note 15.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy law that criminalized private acts of sodomy between consenting, same-sex adults as a violation of the
Due Process Clause).
See Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004) (holding that “the University System’s policy violates equal protection of the laws under the Montana Constitution by impermissibly treating unmarried same-sex couples differently than unmarried
opposite-sex couples”).
See id. at 451 (“Under the policy, the partner of a non-gay employee would qualify for
benefits by signing an Affidavit, when the partner of a gay employee would not qualify for
the same benefits when signing the same Affidavit.”).
In cases where benefits programs classify between unmarried opposite-sex and unmarried
same-sex couples, the state cannot maintain that such programs are rationalized by their
ability to promote marriage. See id. (“A policy that allows unmarried opposite-sex couples
to sign an Affidavit asserting they are common law married, when they may not be able to
legally establish a common law marriage, certainly does not promote marriage, and instead, detracts from it.”).
Id. at 452 (“These two groups, although similarly situated in all respects other than sexual
orientation, are not treated equally and fairly.”).
Id.
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ployees by state benefits programs. Both Snetsinger and Carter were of
particular importance, since Montana and Alaska are states with constitutional marriage amendments defining marriage as between one
87
man and one woman. The plaintiffs in Carter, the Alaska Civil Liberties Union and nine same-sex couples, alleged “that because they are
prohibited from marrying each other by Alaska Constitution article I,
section 25, they are ineligible for the employment benefits the defendants provide to married couples, resulting in a denial of the indi88
vidual plaintiffs’ right to equal protection.” The plaintiffs did not
challenge the marriage amendment, however, but they instead challenged the public employers’ benefits program that denied them the
89
benefits. The court found that although the marriage amendment
precluded same-sex couples from marrying, the amendment itself
clearly did not address employment benefits, since doing so could po90
tentially run afoul of the federal Constitution.
After identifying the grounds for the alleged equal protection
91
clause violation, but before the court could implement Alaska’s
92
more stringent equal protection standard, the court had to resolve
two preliminary issues, one of which was to determine the classification established by the benefits program. While the plaintiffs asserted that the government treated same-sex and opposite-sex
couples differently, the defendants argued that their programs differentiated on the basis of marital status, or between married and un93
married couples. The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ interpretation by finding the proper comparison to be between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, since opposite-sex couples had the opportunity
94
to marry and obtain the benefits, whereas same-sex couples did not.

87
88
89
90

91

92
93
94

See supra text accompanying nn.1 & 17.
Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 784 (Alaska 2005).
Id. at 784–85 (viewing plaintiff’s complaint as one challenging spousal limitations in the
benefits programs).
Id. at 786, n.20 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)) (expressing the concern that
an explicit denial of benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of public employees
would offend the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting gays and lesbians from seeking a
measure designed to protect them under the law).
Alaska’s equal protection clause also guarantees equal rights and opportunities to its citizens. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420
(Alaska 2003) (“We have long recognized that the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection
clause affords greater protection to individual rights than the United States Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
See Carter, 122 P.3d at 787 (citing Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420–21).
Carter, 122 P.3d at 788.
Id.
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The second preliminary issue deals with the presence of discriminatory intent, a concern that will be dealt with briefly in Part IV.C.
Following the decision in Carter, other state courts continued to
95
split over the classification made by benefit plans that provide benefits for spouses and dependents of state employees, as well as the appropriate analytical framework for resolving both statutory and constitutional claims. Nevertheless, in cases that have recently addressed
the issue, courts in states with marriage statutes and amendments
seem to be more likely to find in favor of awarding benefits to the
96
domestic partners of gay and lesbian state employees.
In Bedford v. New Hampshire Community Technical College System, the
plaintiffs alleged that the state’s employment policy unlawfully dis97
criminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation. The
court looked at whether the plaintiffs were part of a protected class
who qualified for the benefits, yet were denied despite their qualification, while the benefits were provided to similarly situated persons
98
outside their protected class. Here, the court found that the lesbian
plaintiffs were a protected class, qualified for the benefits as part of
their positions, and were denied the benefits while married, hetero99
sexual employees received the benefits. As such, the court agreed
with the plaintiffs’ argument that conditioning benefits on marital
100
status discriminated against them on the basis of sexual orientation.
101
By employing the classification framework of Carter, the court in
Bedford was able to extend employee benefits to same-sex couples despite New Hampshire’s marriage laws forbidding marriages between
102
two men or two women. The significant parallels between the legal
analyses of the classification requirement in these cases can and

95

96

97
98
99
100
101
102

Compare Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Tech. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 2006 WL
1217283, at *6–7 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006) (finding that unmarried, heterosexual employees are not similarly situated to unmarried, gay, and lesbian employees for purposes
of receiving employee benefits) with Monson v. Rochester Athletic Club, 759 N.W.2d 60,
64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting Carter and Bedford and finding that a family membership policy facially discriminates on the basis of marital status, not sexual orientation).
See Lobsinger, supra note 17, at 135 (arguing that in Carter the Alaska Supreme Court was
required to treat same-sex couples as their own class and to find that limiting state employee benefits to opposite-sex spouses violated Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause because
of that state’s marriage amendment).
Bedford, 2006 WL 1217283, at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5, *11.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *10–11.
Id. at *10. See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457:2 (2007) (prohibiting same-sex
marriage for men and women).
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should provide support for similar arguments to be made in the context of claims based upon the federal Equal Protection Clause.
B. Rational Basis or Heightened Scrutiny?
The next interpretative difficulty that state courts have faced when
considering claims to extend same-sex public employee benefits is
over what level of judicial scrutiny should apply to these claims. The
difficulty is one that has arisen often in state and federal jurispru103
dence, and has been discussed frequently amongst commentators.
Scholars have also recognized that state constitutional amendments
limiting civil marriage to one man and one woman are pushing the
debate over which level of scrutiny applies to gays and lesbians into
104
This in turn suggests that more cases like Diaz v.
federal courts.
Brewer and Martin v. El Paso are inevitable, so litigants should heed
the lessons of state equal protection cases before bringing federal
equal protection claims regarding gays and lesbians into federal
court.
As discussed earlier, courts often applied some form of rational
basis review to cases where the classification at stake does not involve
105
race, ethnicity, alienage, gender, or illegitimacy. This section looks
at what scrutiny state courts have previously applied in cases to extend same-sex public employee benefits, and lays the groundwork for
the discussion in Part V below over the level of scrutiny that the Diaz
v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso courts suggest should apply in cases to
prevent the benefits’ rescission.
In Hinman, the court found that the dental care plan challenged
by the plaintiffs classified state employees on the basis of whether the
106
Since the classification was
employee was married or unmarried.
based on marital status, and was thus subject to rational basis review,
the court held that the promotion of marriage constituted a legiti107
Due
mate interest, to which the benefits were reasonably related.
to the lack of a discriminatory classification and the existence of a legitimate state interest, the benefits survived the court’s rational basis
103

104
105
106
107

See, e.g., Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 385, 386 (2010) (summarizing case law and scholarly literature and arguing that
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders should receive suspect class status).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection
Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2010).
See supra Part IV.A
Hinman v. Dept. of Pers. Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 417.
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scrutiny and the plaintiffs’ state equal protection clause claim was re108
jected.
The Montana Supreme Court in Snetsinger identified the classification within state benefit programs as one that distinguished between
unmarried same-sex couples and unmarried opposite-sex couples on
109
Under Montana equal protection
the basis of sexual orientation.
jurisprudence, the three levels of scrutiny and their respective tests
are the same as the ones in federal jurisprudence, but the rights they
apply to are slightly different: (1) suspect classes and fundamental
rights receive strict scrutiny; (2) middle-tier scrutiny applies to rights
in Montana’s constitution that do not exist in its Bill of Rights; and
(3) rational basis scrutiny is appropriate when the other levels do not
110
apply. Even though at no point in the opinion does the court name
the test that it is applying, it seems clear that the court is applying rational basis review, especially in the absence of a finding of a suspect
class or fundamental right, and since the court concludes that there
is “no legitimate governmental interest in treating the two groups dif111
ferently.”
In Carter, the court applied Alaska’s three-step sliding-scale test,
which is a judicial invention that recognizes the greater protection afforded by Alaska’s equal protection clause, in comparison to the
112
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
For this reason, at least at first glance, it may appear that the portion of Carter
where the court applies this test is not entirely relevant to federal
equal protection jurisprudence. Nonetheless, a closer examination
of the court’s analysis of the level of scrutiny that it applies to the
benefits program reveals that it is almost completely analogous to the
level of scrutiny analysis under Snetsinger and under the federal Equal
Protection Clause.
To determine what level of scrutiny applies, Alaska courts usually
begin with the first step of the analysis, which requires the court “to
determine what weight to give the individual interests affected by the
113
benefits programs.” Even though the plaintiffs contended that the
benefits program significantly burdened important personal interests,
the court found that this case did not require it to find whether the
government action burdened any of the plaintiffs’ important interests
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 419.
Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004).
Id. at 449–50.
Id. at 452.
Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005).
Id. at 790.
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114

or whether a fundamental right was implicated. Instead, the court
found that since minimum scrutiny was sufficient to decide the case,
115
it did not need to go any further in its first step analysis. The court
viewed the employment benefits as an issue affecting only purely
economic interests, thus mandating minimum scrutiny, or rational
116
Under minimum scrutiny, the
basis review, under Alaska law.
second step required of Alaska’s test only required that the government interests behind the law be “legitimate,” and the third step re117
quired a “fair and substantial relation” between the classification
118
and the purpose of the law.
Most significantly, the Carter court’s application of minimum scrutiny to the interests advocated by the government is nearly identical
119
to those presented in Diaz I. The state presented the court in Carter
with three legitimate interests, which, as we will see in Part V below,
were exactly the same as those that Arizona would later provide to the
district court in Diaz I: (1) cost control; (2) administrative efficiency;
120
and (3) the promotion of marriage. The Carter court went on to reject each of those rationales, because: (1) the limitation of benefits
to heterosexual couples did not advance the state’s goal of providing
them to the individuals who were “closely connected” to the em121
ployee; (2) “the absolute exclusion of same-sex couples is not substantially related to the goal of maximizing administrative efficien122
cy”; and (3) “denying benefits to the same-sex domestic partners
who are absolutely ineligible to become spouses has no demonstrated
123
relationship to the interest of promoting marriage.”
The limited case law regarding same-sex public employee benefits
under state equal protection clauses makes it difficult to argue with
114
115
116
117

118
119

120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Id.
As the court in Carter put it, “Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause requires more than just a
rational connection between a classification and a governmental interest; even at the lowest level of scrutiny, the connection must be substantial.” Id. at 791 (emphasis in original).
See infra note 150.
Id. at 790.
Despite the fact that Alaska’s equal protection clause affords greater protection and thus
may have lead the court to apply a heightened level of scrutiny, the court in Collins similarly recognized that classifications harming politically unpopular groups or personal relationships receive “a more searching form of rational basis review.” See Collins v. Brewer
(Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. 2010) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. at 804–07; Carter, 122 P.3d at 790.
Carter, 122 P.3d at 791.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
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complete certainty that federal courts would uniformly apply a more
searching form of rational basis review on par with the decision in
Carter. Nevertheless, as the discussion in Part V below will demonstrate, the court in Diaz I readily adopted a level of scrutiny that in re124
ality is more demanding than traditional rational basis review. This
suggests that other federal courts would do the same.
C. The Intent to Discriminate
The presence of an intent to discriminate can be an element of
125
both state and federal equal protection claims, and it can be significant in the realm of same-sex state employee benefits. As mentioned
in Part II above, plaintiffs are only required to prove an intent to discriminate by the government when the effect of a law creates a classi126
fication, as opposed to a law that contains a facial classification.
In Carter, the presence (or absence) of a discriminatory intent in
the state’s benefits programs was the second preliminary issue to be
addressed before the court could apply Alaska’s three-step sliding127
The plaintiffs argued that Alaska’s equal protection
scale test.
clause did not require a showing of discriminatory intent, while the
128
defendants argued that it did. Even though it was contested by the
parties, the court found the resolution of that question to be unnecessary, since it determined that the benefit programs were facially
129
discriminatory. By doing so, the court did not need to find intent,
since the question of discriminatory intent is satisfied by a showing
130
The Carter court viewed
that the law is discriminatory on its face.
the benefits programs as classifying gays and lesbians as a different
131
group by the program’s own terms. Citing to a federal decision, the
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See infra Part V.
See, e.g., supra notes 45–46; infra notes 127–28.
See supra Part II.
Carter, 122 P.3d at 788.
Id.
Id.
Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D. Ill.
1997).
Carter, 122 P.3d at 788 (“When a ‘law by its own terms classifies persons for different
treatment’, this is known as a facial classification.” (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4, at 711 (7th ed. 2004)). Even though it may be
suggested that the program’s “own terms” require an explicit reference to gays and lesbians, the group being classified, the Carter court did not find that such a reference was
necessary and instead viewed the program’s literal effect of denying benefits to gays and
lesbians as a sufficient expression of its “own terms.” A more recent edition of Rotunda
and Nowak’s Constitutional Law treatise has cited to Carter’s interpretation as an example
of a facial classification. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 39, at § 18.4 n.5.
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court stated that in these instances “there is no problem of proof and
the court can proceed to test the validity of the classification by the
132
appropriate standard.” As a result, the lack of proof of discriminatory intent did not prevent the plaintiffs from raising an equal protection claim under Alaska’s constitution, and the court proceeded to its
three-step sliding-scale test as discussed in Part IV.B above.
Federal courts and at least some state courts do not require proof
of discriminatory intent for laws with facial classifications when they
133
are challenged under the doctrine of equal protection. So long as
courts like the one in Carter find that benefit programs facially classify
gays and lesbians as a different group, then discriminatory intent will
not be a hurdle to plaintiffs bringing state or federal equal protection
clause claims—but as will be discussed below, in Diaz v. Brewer, courts
may still struggle with this issue in the absence of authoritative guidance.
V. FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CLAIMS IN CURRENT
LITIGATION TO RETAIN SAME-SEX PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
As discussed in Part IV above, arguments involving state equal
protection clauses played a formative role in legal efforts to expand
state employee benefits to same-sex couples. Yet now that domestic
134
partnership benefits have been provided in several communities, a
number of economic or political reasons could encourage state legislators and officials to seek their repeal. This Comment has identified
at least four different communities where local leaders, state legisla135
tors, or the public have sought the removal of same-sex domestic
136
partnership benefits. While not all repeal efforts have led to litigation, and not all litigation has been successful, an inquiry into the legal responses to the threat of repeal is a worthy endeavor. This
Comment proposes that state equal protection clause cases like Tan132
133
134
135

136

Hamlyn, 986 F. Supp. at 1133.
See supra notes 61–64.
See supra note 9.
These actions at minimum seek to remove same-sex domestic partnership benefits, but
some (like Diaz I) remove the benefits for both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners. Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 801 (D. Ariz. 2010).
See supra note 9. The state of Michigan could be considered an additional community,
but in that case the plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that Michigan’s newly approved
marriage amendment did not strip same-sex benefits provided by public employers—an
outcome which the court had previously refused to oblige. See National Pride at Work v.
Michigan, 732 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Mich. App. 2007) (ruling that the marriage amendment
precluded public employers from extending benefits to domestic partners of the same
sex). See also supra note 280.
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ner, Snetsinger, and Carter should serve as a model for future cases like
Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso that rely on the federal Equal Protection Clause, since they offer the best approach for maintaining
state employment benefits for same-sex couples.
A. Diaz v. Brewer: Protecting Same-Sex Public Employee Benefits Under the
Federal Equal Protection Clause
The state of Arizona, like many others, provides subsidized health
137
care benefits to state employees and their dependents. Prior to the
adoption of Section O, Arizona state regulations defined eligible dependents to include each employee’s spouse or domestic partner of
138
the same or opposite sex, which allowed state employees in samesex relationships to obtain the same benefits as married heterosexual
139
Nevertheless, the adoption of Section O changed the decouples.
finition of dependents to exclude domestic partners of both sexes
140
and only provide coverage for an employee’s spouse.
The plaintiffs, gay and lesbian state employees with same-sex domestic partners, brought an action against the state and its governor,
141
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged in
part that:
Plaintiffs will suffer . . . harms based on their sexual orientation and their
sex in relation to the sex of their committed life partner because the
State has enacted legislation that intentionally eliminates family health
insurance for lesbian and gay State employees and not heterosexual employees. As a result of the adoption and enforcement of Section O, heterosexual State employees continue to have a way of obtaining family
health insurance but the only way lesbian and gay State employees have
142
had to obtain that insurance has been eliminated.

The complaint also alleged that the State violated the plaintiffs’ right
to equal protection, and specifically their right not to be denied
143
equal protection on the basis of their sexual orientation.
To prevent Section O from taking effect, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a

137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
Dependents also include the employee’s children and the children of their domestic
partner. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-5-416(C) (2008).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 800.
Id. at 801. See also supra note 138.
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
Amended Complaint at 3–4, Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. 797 (No. CV9-2402-PHXJWS).
Id. at 34.
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preliminary injunction that asked the court to enjoin the state from
144
enforcing Section O.
In the court’s decision granting the preliminary injunction and
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, it stated that the plaintiffs
were “highly skilled State employees whose job duties [were] equiva145
lent to the duties of their heterosexual colleagues.” The court recognized that the plaintiffs and their partners “enjoyed [] long-term,
committed, and financially interdependent relationship[s] and would
146
marry if Arizona law permitted same-sex couples to marry.” Lastly,
it noted that if Section O went into effect, each of the plaintiff’s domestic partners and their qualifying children who were enrolled in
147
the state healthcare plan would lose their benefits.
The district court first looked to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claim
148
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similar to the analysis in Tanner and Carter, the Diaz I court attempted
149
to identify the classification of groups within Section O. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that “the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
150
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”
While the plaintiffs argued that Section O deliberately classified state
employees into heterosexual couples and homosexual couples, Arizona contended that Section O was a neutral policy that treated all
151
unmarried employees equally.
Even though the court found that Section O was not discriminatory on its face, it stated that “as applied Section O ‘unquestionably imposes differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation,’ and
makes benefits available on terms that are a legal impossibility for gay
144
145

146
147
148
149

150

151

Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 799.
Id. at 802. For purposes of motion to dismiss, all of the plaintiff’s allegations of material
fact are accepted as true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id. (citing Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. at 799.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803 (identifying a distinction between unmarried heterosexual state employees and
unmarried homosexual employees); Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska,
122 P.3d 781, 787–88 (Alaska 2005) (identifying the distinction as between same-sex
couples and opposite-sex couples, whether married or not); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci.
Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (identifying unmarried homosexual couples
as a class).
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Note that the “fair and substantial” language describes the exact same relationship that the Alaska Supreme Court
required in Carter. See Carter, 122 P.3d at 791.
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803.

Apr. 2012]

SAME-SEX EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

1377

152

and lesbian couples.”
The finding that Section O was not facially
discriminatory typically means that the court will require proof of in153
Nevertheless, the Diaz I court’s citation of
tent to discriminate.
154
Judge Reinhardt’s opinion in In re Levenson suggests that it viewed
the statute as facially discriminatory under a disparate treatment
155
As Judge Reinhardt recognized, “the differential
framework.
treatment of opposite-sex and same-sex couples ‘cannot be understood as having merely a disparate impact on gay persons, but instead
properly must be viewed as directly classifying and prescribing dis156
tinct treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.’”
Despite the
lack of legal clarity in Diaz I on this issue, the court’s ultimate finding
that Section O burdens the plaintiffs on the basis of their sexual
orientation subjected it to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
157
Clause.
Continuing its Equal Protection Clause analysis, the Diaz I court
next looked to what level of scrutiny should apply to its evaluation of
158
Section O’s constitutionality. The plaintiffs argued that some form
of heightened scrutiny should apply, because Section O treated the
plaintiffs differently on the basis of their sexual orientation, because
gays and lesbians have a history of discrimination and political disadvantage, and because sexual orientation is an immutable characteris159
tic.
The court recognized that some form of heightened scrutiny
152
153
154

155
156
157

158
159

Id.
See Hamlyn v. Rock Island Cnty. Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (C.D.
Ill. 1997).
In re Levenson was a case filed in the Ninth Circuit by a federal public defender, who had
legally married his same-sex partner under California law but was denied healthcare benefits for his partner as part of his federal employment. Judge Reinhardt heard the case,
as designee of the Chair of the Ninth Circuit’s Standing Committee on Federal Public
Defenders, and held that the plaintiff’s rights under the employee benefit plan were violated on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the application of DOMA to the plan
violated the plaintiff’s right to due process under the U.S. Constitution. In re Levenson,
560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803 (quoting In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1147).
In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1147 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 803. The uncertainty over whether the Diaz I court
viewed the statute as facially discriminatory or facially neutral, and thus applied disparate
treatment or disparate impact analysis, is significant to the case, since the requirement of
whether plaintiffs must introduce proof of intentional discrimination hinges on that determination. It is especially relevant given that the plaintiffs are bringing a constitutional
claim, as opposed to potential statutory claims based on an anti-discrimination statute
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination in the workplace. Here, Arizona does
not have a statewide law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
the workplace. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463.
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
Id.
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161

might apply, but in a manner similar to Snetsinger, Carter, and In re
162
Levenson, it punted on the question by finding that the plaintiffs
stated “an equal protection claim that is plausible on its face even
163
under the rational basis standard of review.”
The court’s suggestion that heightened scrutiny should apply was
particularly noteworthy given its citation of Justice O’Connor’s con164
currence in Lawrence v. Texas.
In Lawrence, the Court overruled its
165
prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, by holding a Texas sodomy statute unconstitutional on the basis of privacy and liberty interests un166
der the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although in Bowers the Court
found gays and lesbians not to be a suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny, Lawrence was the first indication that the Court may
apply heightened scrutiny to statutes distinguishing on the basis of
167
Traditionally, federal courts have classified
sexual orientation.
groups as being suspect because: (1) they have historically been
stigmatized or discriminated against; (2) they share an immutable
character trait; and (3) the trait does not affect their ability to contri168
bute to society. As other commentators have argued, a great deal of
evidence exists to support the idea that gays and lesbians should be
169
considered a suspect class for constitutional analysis.
To briefly
summarize current scholarship on the subject, gays and lesbians
should be deemed a suspect class because: (1) they have been a historical target of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation; (2) legal jurisprudence “supports the notion that sexual orientation bears no relation to individuals’ ability to participate and
160

161

162

163
164
165

166
167
168
169

See Snetsinger v. Montana Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004) (“[W]e need not
address the Appellants’ arguments that the policy violates equal protection by classifying
them based on sex or that it violates their rights.”).
See Alaska Civil Liberties Union ex rel. Carter v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 790 (Alaska 2005)
(“But because minimum scrutiny is sufficient to resolve this case, we do not need to decide whether the plaintiffs’ interests are ‘important’ or whether a ‘fundamental right’ is
affected.”).
In re Levenson, 560 F.3d at 1149 (finding that “the denial of benefits here cannot survive
even rational basis review, the least searching form of constitutional scrutiny,” thus “it is
not necessary to determine whether or which form of heightened scrutiny is applicable to
this claim”).
Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
Id. at 804 n.38 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (holding that due process is not violated by a state statute that criminalizes sodomy, since homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right).
Powers, supra note 103, at 387.
Id.
Id. at 388 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973)).
Powers, supra note 103, at 387.
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contribute to society”; and (3) cases have mostly accepted the notion
170
Neither the Supreme Court,
that sexual orientation is immutable.
nor any of the cases discussed in this Comment, have undergone this
analysis, but Diaz v. Brewer and other cases following Lawrence suggest
a movement towards the identification of gays and lesbians as a suspect class at most, and at minimum, recognition of the more searching scrutiny applied to gays and lesbians even under rational basis review.
Arizona gave five rationales for Section O: (1) the statute “will
171
save the State millions of dollars per year”; (2) the statute will be
172
“much easier to administer”; (3) “scarce funds for employee benefits are better spent on employees and dependents as defined in the
173
new statute”; (4) “this benefit would be most valuable to married
174
persons, who are more likely to have dependent children”; and (5)
the new statute “would further the rational, long-standing and well175
recognized government interest in favoring marriage.”
As mentioned in Part IV.B, four of these rationales—numbered (2) through
(5)—are nearly identical to the rationales that the court in Carter reviewed and rejected. Similarly, the Diaz I court addressed and dismissed each of the rationales in turn.
As for the cost savings rationale, the court looked to Graham v.
Richardson for the proposition that states may not “attempt to limit
[their] expenditures . . . by invidious distinctions between classes of
176
The court found the principle to be applicable
[their] citizens.”
because “Section O rests on an invidious distinction between hetero177
sexual and homosexual State employees who are similarly situated.”
Moreover, as this was an order denying defendant’s motion for dismissal, the court accepted as true facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint that the minor additional costs of providing benefits to samesex couples was offset by not having to provide the benefits through
178
Arizona’s Medicaid program.
Regarding the state’s goal of administrative efficiency, the court noted that “the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency”—with the prevention of in170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id. at 388–89.
Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 804–05.
Id. at 805.
Id.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
Id.
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179

vidious classifications being one of them. The court considered the
third rationale—that funds are better spent on heterosexual em180
ployees—as discriminatory on its face, suggesting that it raised at
181
least the implication of Romer v. Evans. Lastly, the court found that
Section O’s distinction between heterosexual and homosexual employees was not “legitimately, rationally, [or] substantially” related to
Arizona’s fourth and fifth rationales, which seek to favor or promote
182
marriage but in reality make the same invidious classification.
Since the court was unable to identify any other legitimate state interest that would support Section O, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs were able to meet the four
elements for a motion for preliminary injunction, which the court
183
granted.
Soon thereafter, the defendants in Diaz I appealed the prelimi184
nary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The defendants’ principal argument was that the district court had incorrectly accepted as true all
of the plaintiffs’ allegations in their motion for a preliminary judg185
However, the district court’s opinion dealt with two moment.
tions—the defendants’ motion to dismiss, for which the proper standard of review is to accept all of the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, and
the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, for which the standard is whether the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success on
186
the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court properly
187
applied each standard to the respective motion.
In reviewing the district court’s order, the Ninth Circuit noted the
court’s emphasis on the lack of evidence put forth by the State re179
180
181

182
183

184
185
186
187

Id. at 806 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that “laws of the kind now before us
raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward
the class of persons affected”).
Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
Id. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument under the Due Process Clause. Id.
at 809. Since this Comment advocates for an approach based on Equal Protection Clause
claims, discussion of the due process claim is outside its scope, despite the fact that the
Supreme Court in practice ignores the formal distinction between equal protection and
due process. See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 749 (“Too much emphasis has been placed on
the formal distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection
guarantees and the liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees. In
practice, the Court does not abide by this distinction.”).
Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1012–13.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
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garding cost savings, which was the State’s primary justification for
188
the statute. Moreover, the State did not seriously challenge the dis189
trict court’s finding regarding cost savings on appeal. The appeals
190
court then looked to United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
for the proposition that “when a state chooses to provide such benefits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that
191
Viewadversely affects particular groups that may be unpopular.”
ing the present circumstances as even “more compelling” than those
in Moreno, the Ninth Circuit found that the Arizona benefit program’s eligibility was restricted in a manner that prevents same-sex
192
The district
couples from retaining eligibility by operation of law.
court’s decision was, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, “consistent
with long standing equal protection jurisprudence holding that
‘some objectives, such as a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpo193
pular group, are not legitimate state interests.’”
B. Martin v. El Paso
194

The case of Martin v. El Paso, while presenting an array of legal
issues, ultimately shaped into a drawn-out legal battle similar to Diaz
195
196
v. Brewer. Religious groups and conservative Christians in El Paso,
Texas sought to have a public referendum that would prevent the city
197
from extending domestic partnership benefits to its employees.
The professed goal of the groups was to remove the benefits for samesex partners of city employees, since some of them believed that the
program “sends young people the message that the city thinks it is

188
189
190

191
192
193
194
195

196
197

Id.
Id.
413 U.S. 528 (1973). In Moreno, the Supreme Court held that an amendment defining
the term “household” to limit a food stamp program’s eligible recipients to related family
members was invalid, concluding that the classification was without basis and aimed at an
unpopular group. Id. at 529–38.
Diaz v. Brewer (Diaz II), 656 F.3d at 1013.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003)) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
Notice of Removal, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2010).
See Marty Schladen, Domestic Partners Vote Nears: Group Offers Free Weddings as Initiative
Draws Criticism, EL PASO TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/
news/ci_16300999 (citing El Paso for Jesus as “one of the organizations that oppose taxpayer-funded medical insurance for unmarried partners of city government employees”).
See Campoy, supra note 11 (providing an example of conservative Christians attempting to
deny benefits to same-sex couples).
See Schladen, supra note 195.
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198

permissible to fornicate and be gay.”
The ballot initiative stated:
“The city of El Paso endorses traditional family values by making
health benefits available only to city employees and their legal spouse
199
Incidentally, when the ballot initiative
and dependent children.”
passed with 55% of the vote, the language of the ballot also had the
effect of eliminating benefits for city officials, who are not technically
employees of the city, as well as many retirees who were no longer city
200
employees but had been offered benefits upon their retirement.
As a result, the president of the El Paso Municipal Police Officer’s
Association, in addition to a lesbian police officer, her domestic partner, and other plaintiffs, brought suit against the city, alleging claims
under the federal Equal Protection Clause, the equal protection and
contract clauses of the Texas Constitution, as well as other state law
201
claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the government interest in passing the ordinance, “endorsing traditional family values,” is not a sig202
nificant and legitimate public interest. Moreover, they argued that
the ordinance is unconstitutional since its discrimination “bears no
rational relationship to the interest of endorsing traditional family
203
values.”
204
After being transferred to federal court, Judge Frank Montalvo
of the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Texas ruled that
the plaintiffs had not established a violation under the federal Equal
205
The court found that, due to the “unexpected
Protection Clause.
consequences” of direct democracy, the ordinance’s language limits
health coverage to city employees, their legal spouses and dependent
children, thereby distinguishing between those people and “everyone
206
Therefore, since the ordinance did not “affect a discrete
else.”
group” nor “identify a class which it treats disparately,” a threshold of
207
equal protection analysis was not met.

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

206
207

Id.
Id.
Campoy, supra note 11.
See Complaint at 4, Martin v. El Paso, No. 2010-4936 (El Paso County Ct., 34th Jud. Dist.
Dec. 15, 2010).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Notice of Removal, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. filed Dec. 21,
2010).
Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint For Declaratory Judgment and to Annul or Invalidate Municipal Ordinance at 18, Martin v. El Paso, No. 3:10cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2011).
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18.
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Despite the absence of a violation, the court went on to advise the
parties how it would have ruled had the ordinance targeted domestic
208
Such an ordinance would create a discrete
partners specifically.
group, leading the court to employ rational basis scrutiny. However,
even under rational basis scrutiny, the court questioned whether the
state’s proclaimed interest in “endorsing traditional family values” is a
209
legitimate one, citing to both Lawrence and Moreno. Lastly, the court
noted that even if it was a legitimate state interest, it was unclear “how
removing health care benefits from domestic partners would rationally relate to that interest,” and the court flatly rejected an interest
210
based on budgetary concerns.
Even though the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, the issue remained
that the city needed to restore benefits to the elected officials and re211
tirees. Faced with the options of restoring benefits to all and dealing with the wrath of voters, or restoring benefits to all except domestic partners and dealing with the wrath of the courts, the City Council
voted 4-4, with the Mayor’s vote in favor as tie-breaker, in support of
212
restoring benefits to all individuals affected by the ordinance. The
controversy did not end there, however. Shortly afterwards, the same
religious groups who supported the ordinance formed a political action committee, El Pasoans for Traditional Family Values, and have
led recall campaigns against the city’s mayor and two of the city
213
council members who voted in favor of restoring the benefits.
Although Martin v. El Paso did not ultimately resolve the equal
protection violation at issue in Diaz v. Brewer, the consequences of the
decision are still enfolding and will likely have important ramifications for communities elsewhere that seek to strip same-sex couples
of public employee benefits.

208
209
210

211
212
213

Id.
Id. at 18–19 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003), and Moreno v. U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973)).
Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Complaint For Declaratory Judgment and to Annul or Invalidate Municipal Ordinance at 19–20, Martin v. El Paso, No.
3:10-cv-00468-FM (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2011).
Adriana M. Chávez, Judge Upholds Ban on Domestic Partner Benefits, EL PASO TIMES, May 25,
2011, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_18132235.
Marty Schladen, City Restores Domestic Partner Benefits, EL PASO TIMES, June 14, 2011, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_18270403.
Marty Schladen, Mayor Tells Court of Intent to Appeal Recall Ruling, EL PASO TIMES, Dec. 6,
2011, available at http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_19477399.
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VI. AN EXPANSIVE FUTURE FOR FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
Tanner, Snetsinger, Carter, and all of the other state cases dealing
with the expansion of same-sex employee benefits provide important
lessons for future plaintiffs who seek to bring similar claims in federal
214
court. Although outcomes will always be dependent in part on the
statutory and constitutional language at issue, judicial precedent, and
the particular facts of each case, these cases demonstrate that common equal protection theoretical underpinnings exist across state
and federal jurisdictions. As more cases like Diaz v. Brewer and Martin
v. El Paso begin to enter federal court, litigants should take note of
the parallel legal analyses that exist under state and federal equal
protection jurisprudences in order to maximize their chances at success. Ultimately, this Comment proposes that the experience of states
in extending benefits to same-sex state employees should guide federal litigants and the courts in reaching similar outcomes, since cases
premised on the Equal Protection Clause provide sound constitutional authority for litigants to refute attempts by state legislators, officials, or even the general public to repeal same-sex benefits for public employees.
A. Classifications on the Basis of Sexual Orientation
Despite early cases that identified benefit programs or policies as
having classified between married and unmarried couples for the
purposes of equal protection analysis, courts are more willing to look
past the legal fiction of these policies in order to find a constitutional
violation. Cases like Tanner and Carter hold value outside their state
jurisdictions, because of the pragmatic rationales expressed in their
decisions. As these cases have articulated, laws or policies that restrict
benefits to legal spouses of public employees classify not on marital
status but on the basis of sexual orientation, because by their terms
gay and lesbian employees can never qualify for benefits in states that
deny them the right to marry, whereas unmarried heterosexuals have
the option of marrying. The classification becomes even more crystallized in the context of the rescission of domestic partner benefits.
The removal of the benefits, while not having direct significance in
constitutional analysis, clarifies for the court that the legislation itself
is creating two classes—unmarried couples that have the option of
214

All of the same lessons from the state cases certainly can and should be used at the state
level to further expand same-sex employment benefits in other states that currently do
not provide them.
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marrying and receiving the benefits, and homosexual, unmarried
couples that do not. Even though earlier cases like Hinman and Ross
did not recognize the distinction in the context of the expansion of
benefits, Diaz v. Brewer and Martin v. El Paso provide hope that judges
can recognize such classifications within policies that seek their withdrawal.
B. Movement Towards Heightened Scrutiny (or Dignity?)
The decision over whether to apply rational basis or heightened
scrutiny to the classifications created by these laws is still an issue of
significant debate. The order in Diaz I did much to advance the
cause of heightened scrutiny, despite its stated decision to ultimately
apply rational basis scrutiny to the government’s interests. This is
215
largely due to the court’s recognition of In re Levenson and Justice
216
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence as having precedential value,
which itself is a significant step towards the acknowledgement of gays
217
and lesbians as a suspect or protected class.
Prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence, some state and federal courts used the
criminalization of homosexual conduct as a rationale for denying
suspect classification, and thus heightened scrutiny, to homosex218
Nonetheless, as Diaz v. Brewer, Justice O’Connor’s concuruals.
rence in Lawrence, and In re Levenson suggest, courts are willing to
scrutinize more closely the rationales provided by states who seek to
remove same-sex employee benefits, even if they do not expressly
admit it.
It is outside the scope of this Comment to advocate for one level
of scrutiny over another, but these cases emphasize the apparent willingness of some courts, both state and federal, to scrutinize classifications on the basis of sexual orientation in benefit programs under rational basis review and find that there are no legitimate reasons for
215
216
217

218

See Collins v. Brewer (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 n.34 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing In re
Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009)).
See Collins (Diaz I), 727 F. Supp. 2d at 804 n.38 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)).
See Powers, supra note 103 (discussing why LGBT individuals are a suspect class and the
necessity of applying heightened scrutiny in order to remedy this issue and ensure equal
protection).
See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that gays are not a suspect class because homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right as decided in Bowers); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (reasoning that homosexuals do not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class if homosexual conduct can constitutionally be criminalized).
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these classifications. This Comment also does not address the courts’
apparent movement away from equality claims and towards individual
219
Professor
liberty claims, as identified by Professor Kenji Yoshino.
Yoshino describes how this movement has led to the rise of hybrid
equality/liberty claims, which he terms “dignity” claims, and believes
that “liberty-based” dignity claims will allow the Court to continue
220
upholding equality in our increasingly pluralistic society. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that there is still a place for equal protection jurisprudence and particularly for classifications on the basis of
sexual orientation, by subscribing to Professor Eskridge’s view that
the Equal Protection Clause alone can provide gays and lesbians with
constitutional “challenges to an array of interconnected discrimina221
tions in state benefits as well as burdens.”
Provided that they are
grounded in a strong factual basis, Equal Protection Clause claims
that challenge a statute’s classification, the rationality of government
interests, as well as the relationship between the two, are more likely
than ever before to meet success.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Comment has explored the relationship between state equal protection claims in state cases to expand same-sex
public employee benefits, and federal Equal Protection Clause claims
brought in federal court to prevent their repeal. Despite their differences, these cases demonstrate an emerging trend in state and federal courts towards the recognition of the classifications within benefits
programs as discrimination against gay and lesbian employees on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Moreover, both state and federal
courts have been willing to closely scrutinize the rationales proffered
by government entities, despite doing so under the guise of rational
basis review.
Litigants in same-sex public benefits cases have a tremendous opportunity to bring the parallel experience of state equal protection
jurisprudence to the federal courts, with the possibility of expanding
federal equal protection doctrine to include the recognition of public
servants who rely upon benefits to take care of their same-sex part219

220
221

See Yoshino, supra note 49, at 748 (“Most notably, the Court has moved away from groupbased equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
Id. at 749–50.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1183, 1216 (2000).
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ners and dependent children. The opportunity exists despite, or arguably even because of, state constitutional provisions and statutes
that define marriage as between one man and one woman. As a critical step in the inevitable progression towards marriage rights for
same-sex couples, let us hope this opportunity does not go to waste.

1388

  

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:5

